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SECTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND REPORTS

American Bar Association
Section of International Law and Practice
Reports to the House of Delegates*
I. Dispute Settlement Under a North American Free
Trade Agreement**
RESOLUTION
The Joint Working Group of the American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar
Association and the Barra Mexicana (hereafter "Joint Working Group") recommends that the American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar Association and the
Barra Mexicana adopt the following Recommendation and Report:
RECOMMENDATION
BE IT RESOLVED that (the American Bar Association) (the Canadian Bar
Association) (the Barra Mexicana) recommends the adoption by the Governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States, in connection with the North
*CAUTIONARY NOTE: Only the RESOLUTION(S) presented herein, when approved by the
House of Delegates, become official policy of the American Bar Association. These are listed under the
heading RECOMMENDATION(S). Comments and supporting data listed under the sub-heading REPORT are not approved by the House in its voting and represent only the views of the Section or
Committee submitting them. Reports containing NO recommendations (resolutions) for specific action by
the House are merely informative and likewise represent only the views of the Section or Committee.
**The following people worked on this Recommendation and Report: For the American Bar
Association: Henry T. King, Jr., chair; Louis B. Sohn; Jay Vogelson; John M. Stephenson. For the
Canadian Bar Association: T. Bradbrooke Smith, chair; Ivan Feltham; George Alexandrowicz;
William C. Graham. For the Barra Mexicana: Hector V. Rojas V, chair; Claus Von Wobeser; Jose
Louis Siqueiros; Julio Trevino; Carlos Loperena R.
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American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), of adequate and sound dispute
resolution procedures embodying shared legal values that, in order of priority,
include
a) the establishment of a Tribunal to decide disputes concerning the interpretation and application of NAFTA;
b) broad recourse for private parties in respect of trade disputes with which
they are concerned; and
c) an effective and flexible system for the identification and management of
disputes.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that (the American Bar Association) (the
Canadian Bar Association) (the Barra Mexicana) authorizes the Joint Working
Group to submit to government officials of the three countries suitable comments
and explanations, consistent with the foregoing principles.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER A
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
A Report by a Joint Working Group of the
American Bar Association, the Canadian Bar
Association and the Barra Mexicana
[This Report represents the collective view of the members of the Joint Working Group on the necessary features of a dispute settlement regime for a North
American Free Trade Agreement. It has been submitted to the appropriate officers of the respective bar associations for consideration and endorsement. If a
draft Agreement were to be made available in future, the Report could subsequently be revised and updated.]
Introduction
General Considerations
The New Dimension
The Old Precepts
Relationship to the GATT
Treaty Architecture
Dispute Management
Adjudication Regime
Treaty Interpretation
Constitution of the Tripartite Tribunal
Powers of the Tripartite Tribunal
Binding Arbitration and the Panel System
Decisions
Review of Domestic Processes
Private Party Issues
Domestic Proceedings
Before the Tripartite Tribunal
Summary of Recommendations
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Introduction
This report represents an attempt by the three bar associations to give some
guidance from the perspective of lawyers on the dispute settlement aspect of the
proposed North American Free Trade Agreement. The extension of the rule of
law to international trade related disputes is important both to the Parties to the
proposed Agreement and to the many private parties whose interests may be
affected in the course of its application.
The development of a dispute settlement regime involves a careful balancing
of many factors. These include many political and economic considerations, not
all of which can be taken into account by the Joint Working Group since its
members are not privy to the current negotiations. To make a more precise
assessment, a draft of the new Agreement embodying their impact would be
required.
However, the Group is concerned to produce a report which not only will
represent a considered approach by the three bar associations but also will be of
assistance to the negotiators. It has sought, therefore, to take into account obvious practical limitations as well as known political and legal constraints. It is
hoped, in consequence, that the recommendations in this report, representing as
they do the views of legal practitioners in the three countries, will be helpful and
will merit close attention by those charged with the elaboration of the Agreement.
The recommendations are concerned with three broad components of an effective dispute settlement formula: first, the management of disputes; second, a
regime for the settlement of disputes; and third, private party involvement in the
dispute resolution process. Following a review of a number of general considerations which have influenced the Group in arriving at its conclusions, the
various considerations bearing on these subjects and related aspects are examined
and are summarized. While they form a considered and composite approach to
the dispute resolution component of the Agreement, the major recommendations
are also capable of individual adoption.
General Considerations
THE NEW DIMENSION:

The addition of a third Party to the existing Canada/U.S. free trade framework
adds a whole new dimension to the trading relationship. The interpretation of the
Agreement will be important to all three Parties even though a particular issue
may involve only two states or a private party and one state administration. The
management of the Agreement to ensure its smooth functioning will be of concern to all three.
Moreover, the very fact of extending the formalized trade relationship to a
third party and its citizens will increase substantially the difficulties involved in
framing an adequate regime of dispute resolution. One must add to this the new
FALL 1992
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elements of a different legal system, a third language and different culture as well
as another framework of domestic trade legislation even though that legislation
may take its inspiration from essentially the same sources. Modifications to the
existing Canada/U.S. regime of dispute resolution of more than a cosmetic
nature will obviously be necessary.
Thus, there is a significant challenge to the Parties in their elaboration of an
effective and fair regime of dispute resolution. But in recognizing this challenge
one must not overlook the fact that all three countries, because of their heritage,
share a mutual concern to work out a law-based regime that will reflect their
common adherence to and belief in the rule of law.
THE OLD PRECEPTS:

What is also most relevant in considering the recommendations which follow
are the basic principles which have been at the root of previous ABA/CBA
reports on international dispute settlement and which are now endorsed by the
reconstituted Joint Working Group. These relate to the three main areas taken up
in the recommendations.
1. The Group is convinced of the importance to any regime of dispute resolution
mechanism of adequate means to manage the Agreement so as to encourage
use of nonconfrontational mechanisms to resolve issues. This implies not only
increased awareness and dedication of special resources within each administration but also the development of new intergovernmental means for defining and defusing and disputes, including fact finding or other processes,
when negotiations fail to produce a resolution of a particular problem.
2. A consistent theme of previous reports has been the fundamental importance of having a mechanism for definitive settlement of legal disputes
when all other options have failed. This is not only for the purpose of
some final resolution to a particular problem, but also to backstop the
negotiating process. A mechanism is required to provide the boundaries
for negotiations in the same way that the existence of judicial recourse to
the courts does in each domestic system.
3. Access of private parties to the regime of dispute settlement is also considered fundamental by the Group. The object is, where possible, to remove disputes from the state-to-state level, where considerations extraneous to the particular dispute may be injected into the process, and to
transfer it to a more technical level. As well, particularly in a trade context,
neither should states in most cases have to carry the burden of espousing
citizens' claims nor citizens be forced to depend on attracting the attention
and support of their state. Finally, where there is private party access, it
gives to aggrieved individuals some sense that their interests are important
and are not entirely subordinated to those of the Parties.
The reconstituted Joint Working Group feels that these considerations are
equally relevant to a broader North American Free Trade Agreement. To the
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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extent they are now reflected in the existing Canada/U.S. Agreement, an effort
should be made to maintain and enhance those elements. They are most important, not only to an effective system, but also to ensuring the extension of the rule
of law in this area.
Chapters 18 and 19 of the existing Canada/U.S. Agreement cannot be simply
incorporated into a new North American Free Trade Agreement without modification. On the assumption that they will be the foundation, or at least principal
points of reference, for a new dispute settlement regime, the Group has used
them as a framework for this report. The changes required in them ought to
reflect the three principal considerations to which the reconstituted Joint Working
Group continues to subscribe.
RELATIONSHIP TO THE

GATT:

The Group is of the view that recourse to the GATT alternative for dispute
resolution should be maintained. The Group is agreed that the mechanism should
be triggered by the complaining party only. This follows the Canada/U.S. formula.
TREATY ARCHITECURE:

An important aspect of the proposed Agreement in relation to dispute resolution is the architecture of the treaty. Here the major issue is the relationship
between the dispute resolution provisions of the new Agreement and those of the
Canada/U.S. Agreement. The Group proceeded on the basis that it is most
unlikely that the existing agreement will be replaced in its entirety. If this be so,
the obvious solution is to leave the old provisions in place to the extent that they
are not inconsistent with the new Agreement.
This point also raises the issue of the extent of the application of the tripartite
Agreement. In this regard, it is also conceivable that the Canada/U.S. Agreement
may eventually be rendered without effect if the new Agreement is one that is
framed so as gradually to take over the entire field of the trade relationship between
the Parties. In any event, the new treaty ought to have a provision to deal with
this problem of applicability under and in accordance with rules it establishes.
On this approach, complete accord on all features of the new Agreement is not
rendered essential for the two Parties to the existing scheme. The only problem in
this latter regard will be the extent to which new and different mechanisms for
dispute resolution are developed that may not apply to the existing arrangement but
may, indeed, be considered more or, possibly, less desirable than those which are
currently in force between Canada and the United States. If a jurisdictional provision
is included as suggested, then this problem can be addressed and resolved.
A more technical point is that the Canada/U.S. Agreement has a multiplicity
of dispute resolution mechanisms scattered throughout its text. To some extent
this is unavoidable. On the other hand, in a new North American Agreement, an
FALL 1992
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effort should be made to bring together, to the extent it is feasible so to do, all
of the dispute resolution mechanisms into a single or several consecutive, interconnected chapters. Such a consolidation would also focus consideration on
dispute resolution generally.
Dispute Management
The Group considers that the complexities arising from a three-Party trade
agreement without any background of tripartite dispute resolution between them
argues for something more than the essentially ad hoc and informal arrangements
currently in force between Canada and the United States. However, it is not
convinced that a new international bureaucracy is required to be put in place at
the inception of the Agreement. Enhanced arrangements within the existing
structures may be all that is required at first as long as there is the possibility of
adding new institutions in the future. What is essential is that the structure lend
itself to meeting certain goals.
Disputes under the Agreement ought to be identified in their nascent stage.
They ought to be managed in a way that will see them not only identified early
but quickly resolved by negotiation. Where this fails, the system should ensure
that issues are
(a) clearly defined and their parameters narrowed,
(b) where desirable, devolved for either future resolution or disappearance
with the effluxion of time, and
(c) where necessary, resolved by following other procedures in the Agreement with as little confrontation as possible.
While to date the limited experience with the Chapter 18 mechanism in the
Canada/U.S. Agreement seems to indicate that it has functioned reasonably well, the
interrelationship between three bureaucracies will prove to be more complicated. A
new tripartite North American Free Trade Commission, taking its inspiration from
Article 1802 of the current Agreement, ought to provide more clearly for consultative arrangements at the public service level. In this regard Article 1802:4 of the
current Canada/U. S. Agreement authorizes the establishment of ad hoc, or standing
committees or working groups to whom responsibilities may be delegated. This
permissive power should be spelled out in more detail.
Not only should the "early warning" mechanism based on existing governmental institutions be improved but also additional arrangements contemplated
for the future. It should be possible for the Governments to constitute a modest
intergovernmental body, perhaps a standing committee, to assist in the identification of disputes and, possibly, with the modalities of their resolution. It should
be possible to effect this without in future having to amend the Agreement.
Besides a possible early warning function, powers in respect of coordination,
mediation and fact finding would be desirable for such a body. For example, a
fact finding function would enable Parties to put certain disputes in a holding
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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mode without appearing to neglect them. This could facilitate resolution at a later
stage since impartial fact finding is frequently a precondition to the satisfactory
resolution of problems. Coordination could become a problem and the existence
of an intergovernmental mechanism might also be useful for this purpose.
The Group, therefore, recommends that the Agreement specifically authorize
the Parties, if and when they determine it will be of assistance, to establish a
permanent mechanism to assist with the resolution of disputes, although not
necessarily to have some independent role in their management. It could be
international. It could be joint, with three sections. It would be permanent,
although it ought to be called upon only when certain tasks are required.
One specific mode of approaching such a mechanism would be through small
organizations established in each capital as sections of an appropriately named
institution. This is the formula used for the International Joint Commission. This
body would be required to meet regularly but on a limited basis and would have
as its mandate to undertake specific tasks either itself or through experts at the
instance of at least two of the three Parties. One additional function might be to
monitor for the Governments the administration of the Agreement from the point
of view of dispute resolution.
It is also conceivable that, in future, such a mechanism might well become a
catalytic force in dispute resolution. With time, if the Parties supported the
evolution, it could acquire some weight in the process which would enable it to
make recommendations, or participate in, various dispute resolution processes
such as conciliation or mediation which are also implicitly now provided for in
Article 1805:2 of the Canada/U.S. Agreement.
If this were done in the Agreement with some particularity, then the changing
conditions, brought on by a functioning and important international instrument
could, in future, be met in a flexible fashion and with a minimum of dislocation.
Indeed, if the Parties contemplate the extension of the new Agreement to other
states, such a mechanism would appear to be a necessary concomitant. Good as
the existing bureaucracies may be, this optional plan would, in the view of the
Group, add to the flexibility the new Agreement will obviously require.
Adjudication Regime
TREATY INTERPRETATION:

The centerpiece of the recommendations of the Group is that a permanent
body, fulltime or capable of being convened without delay, be established to deal
with disputes between the Parties which involve the interpretation and application of the new Agreement. Such a body would be the key element in the entire
dispute resolution process. It would be a permanent institution although it need
not involve structures which at the outset require full-time attention by those
responsible. A stronger and more elaborate system than that now provided for in
Chapter 18 of the Canada/U.S. Agreement is required.
FALL 1992
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The new Agreement will be new international law. Its interpretation can,
therefore, properly be conferred on an international tribunal. There ought to be
no national constitutional difficulties on this aspect. There are, however, two
elements of concern. One is the application or execution of the decisions of the
tripartite body by the Parties. This will be dealt with below. The other, and
possibly related element, is the connection between interpretation and application of the Agreement and the national laws which either implement it or are
impacted by it. In this area there could arise constitutional problems although it
is hard to foresee their nature or extent.
The Group feels strongly that an interpretive body, independent and established under the Agreement in a permanent and not in an ad hoc fashion, is
essential to the ultimate acceptance and smooth working of the document. While
the Parties collectively ought to be able to negotiate issues outside a tribunal
framework, any one Party should always be able to initiate proceedings before
the Tribunal without the concurrence of the others. There should be provision for
notification to a Party not initially involved in a dispute and for its participation
in the proceedings.
CONSTITUTION OF THE TRIPARTITE TRIBUNAL:

A permanent Tribunal need not necessarily have members who have no other
obligations. What is essential is there be constituted a permanent institution that
can be called upon to deal promptly with interpretive issues whenever they arise.
The members must be independent in both a formal and a real sense. They could
be remunerated on a per diem basis until such time as the work of the Tribunal
requires full-time membership and the concomitant requirement of provision for
salaries. Clearly, however, the members should not have, and should refrain
from, activities which might give rise to a conflict of interest with their Tribunal
responsibilities.
Neither does a Tribunal have to begin with a full slate of members. It can
commence with a minimum number to which, as workload may demand, others
may be added. The new Agreement ought to make provision for such extension.
At the beginning it may well be that only three members are required. There
should, however, be alternate members so that the Tribunal can function effectively and without delay. Both permanent and alternate members would come
from the ranks of the bench, bar, or academic communities of the three Parties.
The Agreement could provide for additional members, probably six, plus alternates at the nomination of the respective Parties when they shall have agreed that
the Tribunal should be enlarged.
The Group does not favor the constitution of a Tribunal with members other
than from the three Parties. The new Agreement will be a North American
Agreement with issues familiar to jurists from Canada, Mexico and the United
States. One must assume an independence of mind on the part of its members
VOL. 26, NO. 3
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and the evolution of a Tribunal which, because of its composition, would quickly
take on the characteristics of a court rather than an arbitral body.
Consideration should, however, be given to the possibility that the Tribunal be
empowered to appoint experts in the role of assessors to assist it in technically
difficult cases. The Agreement might provide for these contingencies where, in any
given case, all Parties agree that the Tribunal should be so constituted or assisted.
This would probably also require a somewhat larger panel and it would be necessary
to make provision for spelling out those details. One way of handling this and other
details would be to empower the North American Free Trade Commission to make
detailed rules for the organization and functioning of the Tribunal.
The new Tribunal, perhaps called the North American Trade Tribunal, would
be supported by a very small Registry which, again, could be increased if the
workload so demanded. Both the Registry and the Tribunal ought to operate from
a central location but, perhaps, away from the capitals. This would underscore
the neutrality of the institution. Of course, the Parties may prefer a perambulating body which would hold sessions in the territories of each of the Parties. A
fixed location which might be seen to be sufficiently neutral from a geographic
point of view is, however, to be preferred.
It may be that, initially at least, the Secretaries of the North American equivalent to the Chapter 19 system under the Canada/U.S. Agreement (Article 1909)
could perform the Registry task, assuming, of course, that that system is adopted
for the new Agreement and a Mexican Secretariat is established. This would
allow gradual evolution of the system and avoid a top heavy bureaucratic structure at the inception of the Agreement. Rules governing the operation of the
Registry and proceedings before the Tribunal would be made by the Tribunal.
POWERS OF THE TRIPARTITE TRIBUNAL:

The Joint Working Group considers that a North American Trade Tribunal
should have jurisdiction with respect to disputes involving the interpretation and
application of the North American Free Trade Agreement. This would include
issues of the consistency of national laws with the Agreement. Where there are
differing views as to their respective rights or obligations under the Agreement,
if the Parties cannot agree among themselves, any one of them should have the
right to put the issue to the Tribunal.
There is a second area which could be included in the powers of the North
American Trade Tribunal. There may well be instances in the domestic courts of
the three Parties where a view must be taken on the interpretation of the Agreement. This could also arise in relation to the activities of Chapter 19 type panels.
The Working Group believes it would be desirable for the North American Trade
Tribunal to be given power, upon request, to provide an opinion to a domestic
court on the interpretation of particular provisions of the Agreement. Compare
Article 1808 of the Canada/U.S. Agreement. The precise modalities could be set
forth in the Tribunal's rules.
FALL 1992
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It must be acknowledged that divorcing the issue of interpretation from all the
facts of a given case may not be desirable in many circumstances. Likewise,
there could be problems of timing. On the other hand, the possibility of securing
an opinion-which could be adopted or rejected by the domestic court in its
application to the particular facts-might well, over time, provide an interpretive
framework that would be most useful. The Group recommends that there be
incorporated in the Agreement a scheme for reference of questions on the interpretation of the Agreement at the instance of the domestic court concerned.
Domestic law may also have to be amended accordingly.
BINDING ARBITRATION AND THE PANEL SYSTEM:

Whether the suggested Tribunal procedure should be in substitution for or in
addition to the arbitration and the panel systems as now provided in Articles
1806 and 1807 of the Canada/U.S. Agreement is less clear. The Group recommends that the regime be rationalized and that the Tribunal procedure be the only
one available for the disposition of issues relating to the interpretation and application of the new Agreement. To the extent not overtaken by this formula, the
existing system could continue to apply to Canada/U.S. disputes.
With respect to future proposed measures which may affect the operation of
the new Agreement, the Group would consider it less complicated if only the
new system were to apply. There would be but one recourse in these circumstances to the Tribunal. On the other hand, it is recognized that there may be
reasons to retain the current Canada/U.S. formula for proposed measures which
may demand a less formal and more flexible approach such as that offered by the
panel procedures in Article 1807 of the present agreement. Having regard to the
proposed right of any Party to initiate proceedings before the Tribunal, agreement of the Parties to the dispute would be required.
In this event the equivalent of Article 1807 of the present agreement may have
to be recast and consideration given to whether only two or all three Parties must
be represented on a panel. On the face of it, with three Parties to the Agreement,
the latter alternative commends itself. Similar complications would be involved
were the Parties to wish to retain the section 1806 process as an alternative where
the Parties to a dispute agreed.
DECISIONS:

The Joint Working Group also considered the mechanisms for the implementation of decisions under Chapter 18 of the Canada/U.S. Agreement. While the
scheme of retaliation there found may be the only one available at international
law to underpin decisions or judgments of a North American Trade Tribunal, the
current Chapter 18 mechanism lacks the suasion that could be offered by a
general obligation to implement decisions.
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The Group recommends, in consequence, that the new Agreement incorporate
a basic obligation on the Parties to implement decisions of the North American
Trade Tribunal. This obligation would be supported by a system for retaliation
if decisions were not implemented within a given period of time or not implemented in an integral fashion. To the extent it may be possible to do so, the
amount of retaliation allowed ought to be limited to the degree of default of
implementation or the seriousness of the issue. Put another way, the retaliation
ought to be at the level of the nullification or impairment produced by the failure
to implement the decision.
REVIEW OF

DoMEsTIc PRocEssEs:

A feature of the Canada/U.S. Free Trade Agreement is the Chapter 19 mechanism for dealing with the application of national trade laws. That provision was
included because there was no agreement on the substantive issues of anti dumping and countervail. Essentially Chapter 19 provides for recourse to a specially
constituted panel for the determination of issues relating to the application of
national law where these would otherwise be determined by the national courts.
Chapter 19 does not change national laws, it simply establishes what appears to
be an independent and bilateral mechanism for their interpretation-an interpretation based on the law of the jurisdiction where the matter arises.
Brief consideration was given by the Group to the alternative of the inclusion
in the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of domestic-type issues now dealt with under
Chapter 19 of the Canada/U.S. Agreement. There may have been merit in this
were the matter to have begun without a history of the considerable experience
with the special dispute resolution mechanism in Chapter 19. The Group felt it
was not practical to seek to recast the system for the new Agreement assuming,
of course, that there will be a Chapter 19 type formula included in it.
While at first blush the Chapter 19 system may appear to be flawed in the sense
that it is the laws rather than their administration that may be objectionable, it has
in practice worked very well. There has been general, if not total, satisfaction
with the results of individual cases as well as with the collective experience. It
has also permitted the disengagement of the respective national bureaucracies to
some large degree and allowed the aggrieved interests in each country to make
their cases without any overhanging linkage to other issues. Moreover, the disposition of contentious matters has been speedy.
The very success of this system makes its extension to a new arrangement
most desirable. Whether or not it is altogether logical and whether or not it
responds fully to the real legal difficulties in the trade relationship, as between
Canada and the United States, experience has shown that the system works. It
should also work well in a North American context. An effort should, therefore,
be made to make such alterations in it as will fully accommodate the third partner
in the new Agreement.
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These modifications will not, however, be purely formal. The following new
aspects must be addressed:
1. The existence of a dispute involving interests in two of the three Parties
will have to be signalled to the third Party in case its interests are an issue
directly or indirectly. To this end a system focused on the provision of
notice will have to be worked out.
2. The present panel system may well have to be revised. Depending on the
issue, it could be that all three Parties should be represented on a panel.
This may, in turn, involve panels of a different size. This aspect will have
to be carefully thought out so as not to result in any watering down in the
effectiveness of the present system.
3. With the addition of a third language in the relationship and the possibility
of proceedings on both a bilateral and a trilateral basis, the question of the
language of panel proceedings to be conducted will arise. In addition,
there may be questions of procedure which heretofore have been taken for
granted that will require review.
4. Further consideration will have to be given to the binding character of the
decisions and their influence on the tripartite relationship. In this latter
regard, will a Canada/U.S. decision involving, say, Canadian law, have
any effect on the administration of analogous Mexican trade law for
similar goods from the United States?
Because of its success and its importance to private parties and their lawyers,
the Group recommends that serious consideration be given to extending the
Chapter 19 procedure under the new Agreement to tariff classification, sanitary
and other standards and rules of origin. Where in proceedings taken before a
panel on any such issue a substantial question arises respecting the interpretation
or application of the new Agreement the Panel should be empowered to refer the
question to the Tribunal in accordance with the procedure described below.
Private Party Issues
DOMESTIC PROCEEDINGS:

As already noted, the current Chapter 19 arrangements have seen private
parties largely in control of issues with which they are directly concerned. It has
also seen the elimination from the consideration of the matter at hand of other
unrelated issues between the U.S. and Canada. It is most desirable that this
continue under a North American Free Trade Agreement and, as suggested
above, where possible be extended.
There may, however, be issues arising in relation to the administration of
domestic trade laws that affect the larger interests of the Parties to the new
Agreement. In consequence, each Party might be given the opportunity to involve itself in such domestic proceedings, even if it means detracting from the
position of the aggrieved private party. It is to be hoped that such situations will
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be rare, but the paramount interest of the Parties to the Agreement should be
recognized. The same approach is even more valid in relation to Chapter 19-type
panels.
As well, before Chapter 19-type panel procedures are instituted, issues involving private parties before the administrative apparatus of one of the Parties
to the Agreement should have some predictable course. In other words, the new
Agreement ought, at the very least, to ensure that domestic administrations
cannot frustrate recourse by private parties to the international review process
where matters covered by the new Agreement are concerned.
Finally, the Group feels that private parties will have to rely on local legal
advice and, subject to the immediately preceding consideration, submit themselves to the local legal system so that no special arrangements should be contemplated. This includes language, procedure and substantive law as amended to
implement the Agreement.
BEFoRE THE TRIPARTITE TRIBUNAL:

It may also be desirable to allow private parties to appear in proceedings
before the North American Trade Tribunal. Where an issue of the interpretation
or application of the Agreement arises and where a private party is intimately
concerned in a concrete and real way, there should be the possibility of that party
becoming involved in the proceeding before the Tribunal, with a right ordinarily
limited to submitting written argument unless special conditions for participation
are otherwise established.
The Group feels that participation could be controlled by a specific requirement that any private party seeking to participate in proceedings before the
Tribunal establish that there is involved a matter in which that party has an
identifiable and proximate legal interest. Mere concerned bystanders should not
be allowed to involve themselves.
A different situation may, however, pertain where a reference procedure is, as
suggested, incorporated in the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In a case where it is
followed, it may well be that private parties are the principal protagonists and
will have the burden of argument before the Tribunal. Depending on the circumstances, the Parties to the Agreement may have an equal or greater interest.
They should be permitted to involve themselves as of right and as full participants to the proceedings. As they would have a broader interest in the operation
of the Agreement as a whole, they should be recognized as having an important
role in any proceedings where it is to be interpreted.
A question arises, particularly in circumstances where there may be no Chapter 19 procedure, whether a private party should have some right to initiate
proceedings before the Tribunal in respect of the implementation of treaty obligations on, say, tariff classification, rules of origin or like matters. The Group
takes the view that the Parties to the agreement remain in form the only persons
who can initiate proceedings before the Tribunal.
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It recommends, however, that each Party make provision for a system whereby
private parties can petition their government to raise issues of interpretation and
application before the Tribunal when local remedies are exhausted or unavailable.
The system might include the obligation on the government to give due consideration to the matter and on the private party to carry the burden of the proceedings
in given circumstances. Such a system would have advantages both for the governments and for private parties as the current Chapter 19 procedure attests.
Summary of Recommendations
The ABA/CBA/BM Working Group, having taken into consideration their
respective legal systems and the importance to the effective operation of a North
American Free Trade Agreement of adequate and sound dispute resolution procedures embodying shared legal values, consider that the new Agreement
should, in order of priority, provide for
a) the establishment of a Tribunal to decide disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the new Agreement;
b) broad recourse for private parties in respect of trade disputes with which
they are concerned; and
c) an effective and flexible system for the identification and management of
disputes.
These elements are fundamental to such dispute resolution procedures and the
Working Group recommends they be given effect through adoption of the following:
1. The new Agreement should provide for more extensive and intensive
consultation for dispute resolution than now contemplated by the Canada/U.S. Agreement.
2. Provision should be made for the establishment in the future of an
optional institutional mechanism for dispute prevention and management. It could be constituted as an international body or a tripartite body
with national components. Its task would be to assist Parties in the
resolution of disputes.
3. A system of notification to Parties of existing disputes and of monitoring
their progress ought to be instituted. A Party should, where it considers
its interests under the Agreement to be affected, be able to intervene at
an appropriate level to make representations on the subject matter. The
system should permit the adoption of conciliation and mediation where
they can be agreed on.
4. A permanent tripartite tribunal consisting of an equal number of members appointed by each Party and with their independence guaranteed
should be established to hear and determine cases involving the interpretation and application of the Agreement. To this jurisdiction could be
added a power to hear references from national tribunals concerning the
interpretation of the Agreement.
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10.
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It would be desirable that the tripartite tribunal replace the binding
arbitration and panel review systems in the Canada/U.S. Agreement but
it is recognized that one or both methods may provide some desirable
flexibility in the operation of the Agreement that the Parties would wish
to retain.
The Chapter 19 process in the Canada/U.S. Agreement ought to be
adopted, with necessary modifications, for the new Agreement.
The adjudication regime ought to be extended to tariff classification,
sanitary and other standards, and rules of origin.
The rights of private parties of one state before the national courts and
tribunals of the other two states should be protected so that espousal of
their claims by their own state at the international level, although not
excluded, would be rendered unnecessary in most cases.
The rights of private parties before any permanent or ad hoc tribunal
under the Agreement should be defined and their involvement in any
proceeding that may determine their legal interests specifically permitted
and its limits defined.
Consideration should be given to permitting the Parties to the Agreement
to involve themselves in trade related issues arising out of the Agreement
where important questions going to its interpretation or operation are
before domestic courts. A system of notice ought to enable this to be
made effective.
Joint ABA/CBA/BM Working
Group on Dispute Settlement
Henry King Jr.
T. Bradbrooke Smith, Q. C.
Hector Rojas V.
Co-Chairmen
January 27, 1992

FALL 1992

